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 Lobbying has been an important part of the U.S. political landscape for over a century. A 
rich variety of literature in economics and finance has shown that lobbying efforts aimed at 
congressional representatives can affect political outcomes, and that personal relationships of 
politicians with lobbyists can lead to deferred benefits for politicians. Because of these effects, I 
hypothesize that members of Congress seek access to lobbying, and I look for evidence of this in 
requests for congressional committee assignments submitted by members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives between 2000 and 2008. Modern political science identifies three central 
motivations that drive a congressman to request assignment to a specific congressional 
committee: constituency priorities, policy interests, and a broad desire for political power and 
influence. I hypothesize that a fourth motivation may exist: exposure to lobbyists. If so, then a 
congressional committee’s lobbying exposure would have a significant effect on the desirability 
of that committee and the number of requests to serve on it. Results show that lobbying is 
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Money in politics has long been a contentious topic of debate, which has made it an 
interesting topic of study for economists and political scientists. Decades of empirical research 
on lobbying and financial contributions to political campaigns have shown that a strategic 
injection of capital can significantly shape election outcomes, economic policy, and regulatory 
and economic benefits that accrue to firms. One realm which lends itself especially well to the 
study of money in politics is the U.S. Congress. Composed of 535 members across its two 
chambers, the U.S. Congress is a dynamic arena in which candidates compete for influence 
through committee assignments. Congressional committees preside over a broad range of 
economic and policy legislation, and as the salience of various economic issues changes over 
time, so does attention paid by firms and their lobbyists to various committees. 
The empirical literature on money in politics has largely shown that lobbying tends to be 
more effective than campaign contributions in generating economic benefits for companies. 
Wright (1990) and Sorauf (1992) found that campaign contributions have little direct effect on 
congressmen’s voting behavior and thus benefits for firms. Lobbying, on the other hand, appears 
to have a detectable effect on economic outcomes, and has been linked to lower effective tax 
rates (Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons, 2009) and larger federal grant receipts (De 
Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006), among other financial benefits. Researchers have estimated 
that the overall return to lobbying ranges between 140 and 500 percent (Kang, 2015; De 
Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006). 
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But lobbying may also generate benefits for politicians. Close connections to lobbyists 
employed by prominent corporations lead to professional contacts, which may give politicians 
access to corporate funds to support their reelection campaigns or result in lucrative industry 
employment upon exit from politics (a phenomenon known as the “revolving door”) (Bertrand, 
Bombardini, and Trebbi, 2014; McKay, 2018). The potential for these personal benefits provides 
strong incentives for congressmen to meet the lobbyists’ (and their clients’) demands, which 
helps to explain the exceptional returns that researchers have estimated. If congress members 
stand to gain personally from their connections with lobbyists, then they should be actively 
seeking to maximize opportunities to establish such connections. This raises an important 
question: do members of congress try to increase their exposure to lobbyists through their choice 
of committee service? 
Shortly after elections and before the start of each new congress, all freshman members 
of congress (and some returning members) submit requests for committee assignments for the 
upcoming two-year term. Researchers have identified three main motivations that drive congress 
members to request assignment to a specific committee: a desire to benefit one’s constituency, 
interest in crafting impactful public policy, and desire for personal political power within one’s 
congressional chamber (Bullock, 1976; Deering and Smith, 1997; Frisch and Kelly, 2006). These 
motivations lead congressmen to request to be assigned to a constituency committee, a policy 
committee, or an influence committee, respectively. I hypothesize that what is missing from this 
list is the types of personal benefits that extend beyond a political career---that is, those offered 
by connections with lobbyists. 
Lobbyists tend to work most closely with those congressional committees that deal with 
the most salient economic and political issues. Some of these issues are recurring and 
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consistently fall within the jurisdiction of a single committee (e.g., the House Committee on 
Energy and Commerce), while other issues may arise temporarily as a result of social, political, 
or economic shocks, and may briefly put a committee in the spotlight (for instance, the House 
Committee on Ethics during a governmental misconduct investigation). I use variation in 
lobbying intensity across committees and across time to evaluate whether congress members’ 
interest in committees mirrors that of lobbyists.  
Assuming that members of congress are rational agents, and certain committees offer 
greater exposure to lobbyists, I hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between a 
committee’s lobbying intensity and the probability that it is requested by a congressman. By 
examining committee requests of freshman and returning members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives between the years 2000 and 2008, I provide new insight as to whether there 
exists a fourth motivation for committee preferences within the U.S. Congress. Regression 
results provide support for my hypothesis, showing that there is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between the probability with which a member of congress requests a 






In order to analyze the effect of lobbying on committee choice, I integrated lobbying data 
into the existing theory for committee requests based on the research of Bullock (1976), Deering 
and Smith (1997), and Frisch and Kelly (2006).  
Models 
I began my empirical analysis by examining the general relationship between lobbying 
and committee type, controlling for changes in lobbying over time. This relationship helps 
illustrate whether certain committee types are systematically more attractive to lobbyists. If 
congress members seek exposure to committees that receive more attention from lobbyists, then 
knowing whether there is a systematic bias in lobbying across committees will help me form 
more accurate expectations about congress members’ request behavior. Model (1) is specified as 
follows: 
Lobbyingc,y = β0 + β1Typec + β2Timey + εc,y,   (1) 
where Lobbyingc,y is the total amount of money, in log dollars, spent on lobbying efforts aimed at 
committee c in time period y; Typec is the committee type (constituency, policy,  influence, or 
other), and Timey is a linear time trend. 
Next, I examined whether and how lobbying affects committee requests at the congress 
level. Model (2) below estimates the impact of lobbying efforts on the total number of requests, 
Countcy, submitted by all congress members for committee c during congress y. 
Countc,y = β0 + β1Lobbyingc,y−1 + β2Typec + β3Openingsc,y + β4Timey + εc,y      (2) 
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I lagged the lobbying variable in model (2) by one congress (two years) to allow congress 
members to observe committee-specific lobbying activities before submitting their requests. 
Openingsc,y captures the number of new members added to committee c during congress y, and 
all other variables are as defined in model (1). 
Finally, in model (3), I examined the effect of lobbying on committee requests at the 
individual congress member level. 
PR(Requestm,c,y = 1|X) =
Φ(Lobbyingc,y−1, Typec, Memberm,y, Districtm,y, Openingsc,y, Timey ), (3) 
where Requestm,c,y is a binary indicator set to 1 if member m requests committee c during 
congress y, and zero otherwise; Memberm,y captures congress member m’s party affiliation and 
incumbency status during congress y (i.e., whether the member is a freshman or a returning 
congressman); Districtm,y is a set of seven variables that capture specific constituency 
characteristics of member m’s congressional district---characteristics that help approximate the 
nature of the member’s district (i.e., whether the member represents a narrowly-focused district, 
like a district in rural Iowa that is more likely to be a constituency district, or a district with a 
broader base of political issues); all other variables are as defined in models (1) and (2); and Φ(∙) 
is a standard normal CDF. 
Data 
My data came from two main sources and cover the 107th through 110th congresses (years 
2001 to 2009). Lobbying data come from the House of Representatives Office of the Clerk and 





For each firm that spent $2,500 or more on lobbying activities during a quarter, I observe 
quarterly lobbying disclosure reports that include the broad issue categories for which the firm 
lobbied, a description of the specific issues addressed, and the total amount spent by the firm on 
all its lobbying efforts during the quarter (see Appendix A for list of broad issue categories). 
Altogether I observe 823,490 unique lobbying disclosure documents that cover the time period 
1998 quarter one to 2005 quarter four. 
 
Figure 1. The average amount spent on lobbying committee-specific issues, over two year 
periods. 
I matched broad lobbying issue categories  to the congressional committees that have 
jurisdiction over them using a mapping method developed by Bertrand, Bombardini, and Trebbi 
(2014) (see Appendix B for issues assigned to each committee).  In the case of issues overseen 
by multiple committees (17 of 76 broad issue categories I observe), the mapping method 
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distributes the issue to all committees (usually no more than two) that have jurisdiction over the 
issue. 
Of 823,490 unique lobbying disclosure documents in my sample, 346,315 report 
lobbying activity on more than one issue. This creates some ambiguity about how much of the 
total expenditures were related to each lobbying issue. For simplicity, I assumed that lobbying 
dollars are divided equally and computed an average amount spent per reported issue (see Figure 
1).  
Committee request data 
For each member of the U.S. House of Representatives that submitted a formal request to 
be assigned to one or more committees between 107th and 110th congresses, I observe the 
requested committee(s), the member’s party affiliation, and which state and congressional 
district the member represents. I limited my sample only to requests for standing (i.e., 
permanent) committees because temporary or special committees may not be subject to the same 
systematic assignment process as standing committees.  Of 1,785 total members of congress that 
served in the House during my time sample, I observed a total of 347 unique first-choice 
committee requests and 742 total committee requests, with up to seven ranked preferences (see 
Appendix C for a breakdown of committee requests). Figure 2 shows the distribution of requests 




Figure 2. Number of committee request, by congress 
 
 
Figure 3. Number of requests, by committee/congress;  
No requests reported for the House Committee on Official Conduct 
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181 first-choice requests came from returning members of congress, while 166 came 
from freshmen. While nearly all freshmen members submit formal requests, returning members 
only submit official requests if they are dissatisfied with their assignment during the previous 
congress. By congressional property right norm (Shepsel, 1978, p. 30), all returning congress 
members have a right (but not an obligation) to resume service on the committee(s) to which 
they were assigned during the previous congress. It appears that many returning members during 
my period of analysis were dissatisfied with their previous assignments and chose to submit a 
formal request, rather than to use alternative channels to obtain a seat on a different committee. 
Republicans submitted 218 of all first-choice requests, while Democrats submitted 129. The 
House was under Republican control during my period of observation, and since the majority 
party is entitled to a larger number of committee seats, it is not surprising to observe more 
requests from Republican representatives, although Frisch and Kelly note that even under a 
Democratic-controlled House, Republicans tended to submit more committee requests (Frisch 
and Kelly, 2006, p. 98). 
Committee type data 
To represent the three original committee request motivations identified in the literature, I 
used the classification identified by Frisch and Kelly (2006) to specify each House committee in 
my sample as either influence committee, constituency committee, policy committee, or other. 







I collected additional publicly available data on characteristics of congressional districts 
over time in order to more accurately delineate constituency committees. The constituency-
driven motivation of committee requests posits that constituency-driven congress members select 
committees that reflect the dominant interests of the voters within their districts in order to 
improve chances of the members’ reelection. Frisch & Kelly (2006, p. 107) confirmed this 
relationship for the narrowly focused committees on Agriculture and the Armed Forces, though 
not for other committees. 
To better represent constituency committees, I selected demographic proxies to 
characterize each of the seven identified constituency committees in the U.S. House of 
Representatives: Agriculture; Armed Services; Natural Resources; Science, Space, and 
Technology; Small Business; Transportation and Infrastructure; and Veterans’ Affairs. Replacing 
the constituency indicator variable with these proxies in my regression models allowed me to 
evaluate whether some constituencies were more attractive to congressmen regardless of the 
amount of lobbying they attracted. 
The variables I chose to represent constituent interests are informed by the issues over 
which each committee has jurisdiction, which are specified under House Rule X. Constituencies 
are represented as follows: Agriculture: percent of congressional district’s civilian population 16 
years and older employed in agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting; Armed Services: percent 
of district’s labor force employed in the armed forces; Natural Resources: an indicator of 
whether or not the congressional district contained within its geographic area a national 
battlefield, site, park, historic park, preserve, reserve, lakeshore, monument, military park, 
memorial, river, recreation area, seashore, scenic or recreational river or trail, or parkway; 
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Science, Space, and Technology: percent of employed civilian population engaged in life, 
physical, and social science occupations; Transportation and Infrastructure: amount of federal-
aid highway funding by lane mile; Small Business: the total number of businesses under 500 
employees in the state; Veterans’ Affairs: percent of the district’s population 18 and older that 
are veterans. 
 
Figure 4. Select constituency demographics, by data source. 
Demographic characteristics for agriculture, armed services, veteran, natural resources, 
and science constituencies come from the 2000 census for the 107th Congress and the 2006 
American Community Survey (ACS) for the 108th to 110th Congresses, while data for 
transportation and infrastructure came from the Federal Highway Administration. The 2006 
American Community Survey is based on a representative sample of the U.S. population, which 
alleviates any concern about bias. Even though my constituency proxies were somewhat lower 
(by 8 to 20 percent as shown in Figure 4) using ACS data than 2000 Census data, the difference 
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was systematic across all variables and partly reflected geographic changes that followed the 
2002 redistricting. Appendix D provides summary statistics for each of my chosen constituency 
variables. 
Committee openings data 
I assumed that the number of openings on a committee would likely impact the number 
and probability of a given member to request a committee. Congress members would be more 
likely to request a spot on a committee for which they know spots are available. If the number of 
openings is low or zero, a request would most likely be wasted. To better capture preferences for 
committees with open spots, I included a count of the number of new members admitted to a 
committee during a particular congress. Thus, I assume that all congress members know how 
















I estimated three regression models to examine the relationship between lobbying and 
congressional committee requests. I first modeled the relationship between lobbying and 
committee type to investigate general lobbying patterns. Next, I investigated how lobbying 
impacts aggregate requests for specific House committees, estimating the impact of lobbying 
intensity on the average congress member. Lastly, I modeled the effect of committee-specific 
lobbying intensity on an individual congress member’s probability of requesting that committee. 
These three models provide a well-rounded view of the relationship between firms’ lobbying 
efforts and congressmen’s committee preferences. 
Model 1 
 Table 1 shows results of my first empirical model, depicted in equation (1). The 
constituency committee serves as the reference category. Results show a statistically significant 
relationship between committee type and lobbying intensity, measured by the average 
committee-level lobbying expenditure during a given congress. Specifically, all else equal, over 
my period of analysis firms spent significantly more money lobbying policy and influence 
committees than they did lobbying constituency committees. Lobbying expenditures also 
increased over time, by about 20 percent per two-year congressional period. Not surprisingly, 
these results suggest that lobbyists engage more with certain committee types systematically, 
rather than distributing their efforts among committee types randomly. 
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Model 2 
 Table 2 displays results of my second empirical model, described by equation (2). Again, 
constituency committees serve as the reference category. The first column of table 2 displays 
results where the outcome variable counts the total number of times a committee is requested, 
regardless of how far down the list of preferences it appears. In the second column, the outcome 
variable counts the number of times a committee appears as one of the top three preferences. The 
third column reports results where the outcome variable counts only the number of times a 
committee appears as a congress member’s top choice. All three model specifications show that 
an increase in lobbying expenditures is associated with a larger number of requests for that 
committee. Specifically, a 100 percent increase (i.e., doubling) in lobbying spending is 
associated with an additional two to three requests for a committee. This confirms my main 




Policy              1.062*** 
                  (0.033)    
 
Influence           0.864*** 
                  (0.032)    
 
Other              -0.106*** 
                  (0.025)    
 
Time                0.182*** 
                  (0.012)    
 
_cons              17.253*** 
                  (0.035)    
---------------------------- 
N                    6669    
---------------------------- 
Robust standard error in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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hypothesis that congress members’ requests are indeed related to how much exposure to 
lobbyists a committee provides. 
Policy and influence committees appear on request lists no more frequently than 
constituency committees, although there is some evidence that influence committees appear on 
request lists less frequently. Interestingly, there does not appear to be any relationship between 





Table 2. Impact of lobbying on the total number of times a committee is requested 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
             All Requests     Top Request       Top Three    
------------------------------------------------------------ 
ln(Lobbying)        2.543***        2.269***        2.965*** 
                  (0.860)         (0.668)         (0.854)    
 
Policy              0.319           0.332           0.251    
                  (2.764)         (1.701)         (2.720)    
 
Influence          -4.792**         1.048          -2.853    
                  (2.391)         (1.725)         (2.434)    
 
Other              -6.101**        -0.503          -3.782    
                  (2.805)         (1.829)         (2.746)    
 
Openings            0.473           0.324           0.473    
                  (0.302)         (0.211)         (0.301)    
 
Time               -3.598***       -1.819***       -3.192*** 
                  (0.746)         (0.536)         (0.736)    
 
_cons             -28.807**       -34.471***      -39.795*** 
                 (13.132)        (10.106)        (12.826)    
------------------------------------------------------------ 
N                      76              76              76    
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Robust standard error in parentheses 




 Tables 3 and 4 report results for equation (3), estimated as a Probit at the individual 
congress member level. Once again constituency serves as the reference committee type. I report 
marginal effects, rather than coefficients of Probit regressions. The outcome variable in Table 3 
is a binary indicator set to one if a member has requested assignment to a committee, and zero 
otherwise, and the three columns report the same specifications described in table 2. Results in 
Table 3A are based on a model that includes specific demographic characteristics for district 
constituencies, though these are not reported. 
All three model specifications in Table 3 indicate that a one percent increase in lobbying 
is statistically significantly associated with a 3.7 to 4.7 percent increase in the probability that a 
congress member requests the lobbied committee. This provides even stronger evidence than that 
in table 2 that congressmen pay attention to a committee’s potential to expose them to lobbyists. 
As in table 2, policy committees do not appear to be more likely to be requested than 
constituency committees, but there is stronger evidence that influence committees are less likely 
to be requested. This is consistent with the fact that influence committees are traditionally 
populated by experienced congress members with a proven track record. Thus, the low chance of 
assignment disincentivizes freshman congress members from requesting influence committees. 
Evidence on returning members is consistent with what we know about the avenues by 
which members get assigned to committees. Freshman members rely primarily on formally 
submitted requests, while returning congress members can also use informal networking 
channels to petition for a specific assignment. Thus, returning members are less likely to submit 
a formal request than freshman members. The data partly confirm this, showing that even though 
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returning members may be no less likely to submit an official request, they tend to limit their 
request lists to a single top-choice committee. 
 
All constituency characteristics in this model are statistically insignificant, suggesting 
that aggregating committees across broad motivation-related types is appropriate (i.e., I don’t 
gain any additional insight into congress members’ request behavior by using more refined 
measures of the preferences of their district’s voters). 
Table 3.  Lobbying intensity and congress member’s probability of requesting a committee 
 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
             All Requests     Top Request       Top Three    
------------------------------------------------------------ 
ln(Lobbying)        0.032***        0.034***        0.039*** 
                  (0.004)         (0.004)         (0.004)    
 
Policy             -0.000          -0.002          -0.002    
                  (0.009)         (0.008)         (0.009)    
 
Influence          -0.057***        0.005          -0.037*** 
                  (0.010)         (0.007)         (0.009)    
 
Other              -0.144***       -0.044*         -0.110*** 
                  (0.035)         (0.025)         (0.034)    
 
Returning          -0.095***       -0.002          -0.058*** 
                  (0.008)         (0.005)         (0.007)    
 
Party               0.051***        0.003           0.028*** 
                  (0.009)         (0.006)         (0.008)    
 
Openings            0.006***        0.002**         0.005*** 
                  (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)    
 
Time               -0.007*         -0.008***       -0.010*** 
                  (0.004)         (0.003)         (0.004)    
------------------------------------------------------------ 
N                    6669            6669            6669    
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Constituency characteristics included, but not reported 
Robust standard error in parentheses 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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I estimate model 3 a second time, introducing party-specific committee types. These 
committee types are recategorized based on how the average member of each party views each 
committee in terms of their legislative and personal motivations. Differences in categorization 
occur because the two primary U.S. political parties have different voter bases and policy 
priorities . For example, House Democrats view the House Committee on Banking and the 
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology as primarily policy committees, while 
Republicans view them as mixed constituency and policy committees. Appendix F shows the 
breakdown of these party-specific committee types as identified by Fisch and Kelly (2006). 
Table 4 reports the marginal effects from these Probit regressions with the constituency 
committee type as the reference category. Once again, lobbying appears to be positively and 
statistically significantly related to the probability that a congressman requests assignment to a 
specific committee. A one percent increase in lobbying leads to a 3 to 3.6 percent increase in the 
request probability. This model again illustrates that policy and constituency committees, and in 
this case, mixed policy/constituency committees, are selected at similar rates when looking at all 
or the top three requests. The probability of an influence committee being requested is 2.8 to 4.3 
percent lower and the probability of a mixed policy/influence committee being requested in 
around 6 percent lower, compared to a pure constituency committee, when looking at top three 
and all requests. Committees that are not attached to a specific motivation are 7 to 10.8 percent 
less likely to be requested across all models. These results complement those displayed in Table 
3 and confirm the observations of Frisch and Kelly (2006) on party-specific committee request 
motivations. All other evidence is consistent with that in Table 3. 
An interesting pattern emerged when I considered results from tables 2 to 4 in 
combination. Lobbying intensity is the only variable that remained consistently correlated with a 
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top choice committee’s request probability. The remaining explanatory variables—committee 
type, congress member characteristics, and number of committee openings—were statistically 
correlated only for committees that appeared lower on a congress member’s preference list. 
 
Table 4.  Lobbying intensity and the probability of committee request 
Outcome Variable: Probability of Request 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
             All Requests     Top Request       Top Three    
------------------------------------------------------------ 
ln(Lobbying)        0.030***        0.031***        0.036*** 
                  (0.004)         (0.003)         (0.004)    
 
Con./Pol.           0.005           0.003          -0.005    
                  (0.010)         (0.007)         (0.009)    
 
Policy             -0.016          -0.016          -0.014    
                  (0.015)         (0.011)         (0.014)    
 
Pol./Inf.          -0.065***       -0.008          -0.059*** 
                  (0.014)         (0.008)         (0.012)    
 
Influence          -0.043***        0.012          -0.028**  
                  (0.012)         (0.008)         (0.011)    
 
Other              -0.108***       -0.070***       -0.098*** 
                  (0.015)         (0.014)         (0.014)    
 
Returning          -0.096***       -0.002          -0.058*** 
                  (0.008)         (0.005)         (0.007)    
 
Party               0.047***       -0.002           0.024*** 
                  (0.009)         (0.006)         (0.008)    
 
Openings            0.005***        0.001*          0.005*** 
                  (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)    
 
Time               -0.007*         -0.007***       -0.010*** 
                  (0.004)         (0.003)         (0.004)    
------------------------------------------------------------ 
N                    6669            6669            6669    
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Constituency characteristics included, but not reported 
Robust standard error in parentheses 






In this thesis I proposed that information about congressional lobbying activities can help 
us better understand what drives congress member’s preferences over congressional committees. 
Existing empirical literature on the role that money plays in politics has found significant returns 
to lobbying and more modest benefits to political campaign contributions. Motivated by this 
observation, I proposed to augment the existing model of congressional committee preferences. 
Specifically, I proposed that in addition to being driven by one of three established motivations 
for committee service—the needs of one’s constituency, the desire to form meaningful policy, 
and personal aspiration for power within one’s congressional chamber—congress members may 
also be motivated by potential personal benefits that result from forming close relationships with 
lobbyists (e.g., access to corporate funds and post-political private industry employment). I 
hypothesized that a congress member’s preference over committee assignment is thus 
statistically related to the intensity with which a specific congressional committee gets lobbied. 
To test this hypothesis, I combined data on lobbying activities with congressional 
committee requests and congressional district characteristics to estimate the empirical 
relationship between lobbying, committee characteristics, and committee requests. The results of 
my three regression models show a positive statistical correlation between the probability with 
which a congressman requests a committee and the lobbying intensity of that committee. 
Although policy and influence committees seem to systematically attract more lobbying than 
constituency committees, lobbying expenditures are positively correlated with the probability 
that a member of the U.S. House of Representatives requests a particular committee even when I 
23 
account for the characteristics of that committee. This result is consistent with the theory of self-
interested legislators and helps to expand our understanding of congressional motivations behind 
committee preferences. It also suggests that the mechanism through which lobbyists—and firms 
that hire them—are able to influence legislative outcomes operates through legislators’ self-
interest, suggesting important consequences for social welfare in a political system that easily 
accommodates the pursuit of personal gain. A further discussion of such consequences, however, 
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Broad lobbying issue categories observed in Congressional Lobbying Reports 
ACC Accounting HCR Health Issues 
ADV Advertising HOU Housing 
AER Aerospace IMM Immigration 
AGR Agriculture IND Indian/Native American Affairs 
ALC Alcohol and Drug Abuse INS Insurance 
ANI Animals LBR Labor Issues/Antitrust/Workplace 
APP Apparel/Clothing, Industry/Textiles LAW Law Enforcement/Crime/Criminal Justice 
ART Arts/Entertainment MAN Manufacturing 
AUT Automotive Industry MAR Marine/Maritime/Boating/Fisheries 
AVI Aviation/Aircraft/Airlines MIA Media (Information and Publishing) 
BAN Banking MED Medical/Disease Research/Clinical Labs 
BNK Bankruptcy MMM Medicare/Medicaid 
BEV Beverage Industry MON Minting/Money/Gold Standard 
BUD Budget/Appropriations NAT Natural Resources 
CHM Chemicals/Chemical Industry PHA Pharmacy 
CIV Civili Right/Civil Liberties POS Postal 
CAW Clean Air and Water Quality RRR Railroads 
CDT Commodities (Big Ticket) RES Real Estate/Land Use/Conservation 
COM Communications/Broadcasting REL Religion 
CPI Computer Industry RET Retirement 
CSP Consumer Issues/Safety/Protection ROD Roads/Highway 
CON Constitution SCI Science/Technology 
CPT Copyright/Patent/Trademark SMB Small Business 
DEF Defense SPO Sports/Athletics 
DOC District of Columbia TAX Taxation/Internal Revenue Code 
DIS Disaster Planning/Emergencies TEC Telecommunications 
ECN Economics/Economic Development TOB Tobacco 
EDU Education TOR Torts 
ENG Energy/Nuclear TRD Trade (Domestic and Foreign) 
ENV Environmental/Superfund TRA Transportation 
FAM Family Issues/Abortion/Adoption TOU Travel/Tourism 
FIR Firearms/Guns/Ammunition TRU Trucking/Shipping 
FIN Financial 
Instruments/Investments/Securities 
URB Urban Development/Municipalities 
FOO Food Industry (Safety, Labeling, etc) UNM Unemployment 
FOR Foreign Relations UTI Utilities 
FUE Fuel/Gas/Oil VET Veterans 
GAM Gaming/Gambling/Casinos WAS Waste (hazard/solid/interstate/nuclear) 




Lobbying Issues Assigned to Each House Committee for 107th-110th Congresses 
Partially reproduced from Bertrand, Bombardini, & Trebbi, 2014 
Agriculture: AGR, FOO, TOB, ANI, CDT 
Appropriations: BUD 
National Security (107-108)/Armed Services (109-110): AER, DEF, HOM, INT 
Financial Services: HOU, FIN, INS, RES, MON, BAN, BNK, URB, GAM 
Budget: BUD 
Education and the Workplace (107-109)/Education and Labor (110): EDU, FAM, LBR, RET, ALC, WEL, REL, 
ART 
Energy and Commerce: ACC, CSP, ENG, TEC, FOO, FUE, ALC, MMM, MED, ENV, SPO, TRD, TOU, HCR, 
CAW, WAS, UTI, PHA, MAN, ADV, MIA, CPI, COM, CDT, CHM, BEV, AUT, APP 
International Relations (107-109)/Foreign Affairs (110): FOR, ECN, REL 
Government Reform and Oversight (107-109)/Oversight and Government Reform (110): GOV, POS, DOC 
House Oversight (107-108)/House Administration (109-110): GOV 
Judiciary: LAW, CON, CPT, IMM, CIV, TOR, FIR 
Natural Resources (110)/Resources (107-109): MAR, NAT, IND, RES, GAM, CDT 
Transportation and Infrastructure: APR, RRR, ROD, TRA, TRU, DIS 
Rules: GOV 
Science (107-109)/Science and Technology (110): ENG, SCI, AER, AVI, CPI 
Small Business: SMB 
Standards of Official Conduct: GOV 
Veterans Affairs: VET 













Summary statistics for demographic constituency variables 
Variable Mean  Standard Deviation Range 
Armed Forces (107) .0053  .0121 0.0-0.125  
Armed Forces (108-110) .0042 .0088 0.0-0.0782 
Agriculture (107) 0.0153 0.0203 0.0-0.223 
Agriculture (108-110) 0.0141 0.02 0.0-.1995 
Science (107) 0.009 0.0052 0.003-0.046 
Science (108-110) 0.009 0.0053 0.0013-0.0403 
Veteran (107) 0.1264 0.0306 0.032-0.229 
Veteran (108-110) 0.1037 0.0293 0.0242-0.2137 
Highway (107) 4.3851 2.1319 1.0339-14.7924 
Highway (108-110) 4.9203 2.2767 1.1066-14.9034 
Small Business (107) 0.5027 0.0368 
0.4349-0.7051 












Partially reproduced from Frisch & Kelly, 2006. 
Constituency Policy Influence 
Agriculture Banking Appropriations 
Armed Services Education and Labor Budget 
Natural Resources Energy and Commerce Rules 
Public Works Foreign Affairs Ways and Means 
Science Judiciary  
Small Business Government Operations  
Veterans Affairs Ethics  






Committee classification by political party 
Partially reproduced from Frisch & Kelly, 2006. 
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Labor 
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“Other” committees omitted 
 
